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Dimensions of the Worldwide Merger Boom 
Frederic L. Pryor 
The capstone of the worldwide merger activities of the 1990s occurred within the first 
five weeks of 2000 with the announced $165 billion planned purchase of Time-Warner 
by America Online and the $183 billion takeover of Mannesmann by Vodaphone 
AirTouch. Three other mega-mergers brought the total volume of merger activity in the 
same five weeks to more than half a trillion dollars.' Although subsequent actions by 
European Union's Competition Commission whittled down the size of several of these 
mergers, their overall volume is still impressive. 
Despite the reporting of particular mergers in the daily press, it is difficult to gain 
perspective on merger and acquisition (M&A) activities from such anecdotal evi- 
dence. And without a quantitative view of the dimensions of this process, we cannot 
begin to determine whether this merger movement will lead to a permanent change in 
the organization of industry. 
This essay has two purposes: to present data hitherto unavailable for various 
important dimensions of the merger tsunami in both the United States and abroad dur- 
ing the final two decades of the twentieth century and to draw attention to some crucial 
implications of these activities for the world economy. In particular, I focus on the 
impact on enterprise size and on industrial concentration. Although increasing indus- 
trial concentration may not necessarily signify decreasing competition, it is certainly 
an important component.2 The basic information came from a business database of 
mergers that has seldom been employed by economists and that allows an aggregate 
perspective. 
The analysis is straightforward. The first section focuses briefly on the database 
from which the basic information on mergers and acquisitions for 1985 through 1999 
The author is Emeritus Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, USA. He wishes to 
thank Zora Pryor, F. M. Scherer, and several unknown referees for comments on a previous draft of this 
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is drawn. The second section outlines some basic dimensions of the M&A boom both 
in the United States and abroad-the volume, average size, sectoral composition, and 
geographical distribution. The final section focuses on three issues: the short-run 
impact of such mergers on the changing size of enterprises; the short-run implications 
of such mergers on market competition, using data on the extent to which such merg- 
ers involve enterprises in the same four-digit industries; and the probability that these 
merged enterprises represent a permanent change in market structure. 
The Database 
The tables in this essay are calculated from a database of mergers and acquisitions 
that is maintained by Thompson Financial Securities Data (TFSD).3 This commercial 
company collects information on publicly announced mergers and acquisitions in the 
world, using English and foreign language news sources, filings at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and its international counterparts, trade publications, 
proprietary surveys of investment banks, law firms, and other sources. The M&A data 
cover corporate transactions involving at least 5 percent of the ownership of a com- 
pany where the transaction is valued at $1 million or more (after 1992, deals of any 
value are covered) or where the value of the transaction was undisclosed. Both public 
and private transactions are included. 
From TFSD I purchased a listing of all M&A deals and their value as well as the 
names, standard industrial classification (SIC) codes, and nationality of the companies 
involved for 1985, 1992, and 1999. In addition, I obtained from them an aggregate 
time-series for the entire period from 1985 to the present.4 Aside from straightforward 
mergers and acquisitions, transactions included in this database are purchases of large 
stakes, stock swaps, real estate investment trust (REIT) acquisitions, asset sales and 
divestitures, leveraged buyouts, tender offers, spinoffs and splitoffs, and so forth. 
These data do not, however, contain information on joint ventures, strategic alliances, 
or other such arrangements that may act to decrease competition (see Pryor 2001 a) nor 
on profits resulting from such mergers. 
Since I wished to focus on transactions with a primary impact on the industrial 
structure, I adjusted the data on individual deals to eliminate the following transac- 
tions: apparent duplicates and leveraged buyouts (LBOs), own stock purchases, and 
other deals in which the firm is listed as purchasing itself. In addition, I eliminated all 
transactions involving private and miscellaneous investors (SIC 6799), since most of 
these seemed to represent a change in ownership rather than the managing or merging 
of two different companies. 
The database is not ideal. Although TFSD began collecting these data in the early 
1 980s, the company is reasonably confident of the completeness of the data only for 
the 1 990s. This means that the data for 1985 should be considered as a sample, rather 
than the full universe. Moreover, for roughly half of the merger deals, the value of the 
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deal could not be determined, although it seems likely that these primarily involved 
smaller transactions and, as I show below, certain adjustments can be made to com- 
pensate for this problem. Finally, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of the informa- 
tion, especially the assigned SIC codes. Nevertheless, with suitable caution the data 
are usable for the purposes of this exposition. 
Trends 
Total Volume 
The key question is the volume of mergers and their trend. Table 1 presents data 
for three years on the total volume of mergers and acquisitions, measured in terms of 
total number of mergers, total number of mergers with available data on the value of 
the deal, and total values of such mergers. I divided the mergers into four categories of 
transactions depending upon the nationality of the buying and the target companies. 
Aside from the total recorded value of the deals, I also estimated the total value of 
all deals. This required an assumption about the ratio of the average value of the unre- 
corded deals to the average value of the recorded deals in the target industry. Since it is 
the smaller deals whose values are often not widely known, this ratio is a fraction of 
the value of the deals with reported dollar amounts. I have arbitrarily assumed that in 
each of fifteen different industrial sectors in each of the four different types of transac- 
tions (defined in terms of the nationality of the buyer and seller), the "critical ratio" of 
the value of the deals that are not announced is one sixth of the average value of the 
deals that are announced; in most cases these estimated values are close to the median 
size of merger. Obviously, this particular assumption can be challenged, but it turns 
out that the specific value chosen does not greatly affect the calculated trend in merger 
values. For instance, between 1992 and 1999 the total recorded value of deals grew at 
an annual rate of 35.7 percent. If the critical ratio is assumed to be 1/9, 1/6, or 1/3, the 
average annual growth rates in merger values in the same period were respectively 
35.2, 35.1, and 34.6 percent. The total value of the deals is, of course, much more 
affected by such an assumption. More specifically, for the total deals in 1999, the esti- 
mated value would have been 5.5 percent lower or 16.4 percent higher if I had 
assumed the critical value to be respectively 1/9 or 1/3. Nevertheless, since I focused 
more on trends than on absolute values, this difference did not affect my major 
conclusions. 
The estimated total volume of mergers and acquisitions rose at an average annual 
rate of 20.8 percent over the fourteen-year period from 1985 through 1999. By using 
aggregate annual data (that did not include the adjustments I made to the data) to inter- 
polate between the benchmark years,5 this trend can be seen most dramatically in chart 
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Table 1. Worldwide Mergers in Three Years Listed by Nationality of Buyers 
and Targets 
Buying companies: US US Non-US Non-US 
Target companies: US Non-US US Non-US Total 
Actual number of deals 
1985 1,378 89 197 259 1,923 
1992 3,373 519 357 5,747 9,996 
1999 6,801 1,380 970 10,795 19,946 
Deals with data on the values of the transaction 
1985 690 18 100 151 959 
1992 1,636 203 201 2,075 4,115 
1999 2,961 528 531 4,540 8,560 
Recorded value of deals (million$) 
1985 105,725 3,446 17,968 15,235 142,373 
1992 89,960 12,184 10,792 118,807 231,742 
1999 921,629 103,387 224,841 714,193 1,964,050 
Estimated value of all deals (million$) 
1985 123,447 4,618 20,694 17,023 165,781 
1992 104,884 15,109 12,340 154,057 286,391 
1999 1,098,688 130,560 251,350 867,548 2,348,147 
Note: The sources and adjustment of the data are described in the text. The estimated values of all deals are 
made by assuming that for the fifteen sectors for each of the four types of transactions, the average size of the 
transactions was equal to one sixth of the size of the recorded transactions of the target companies in the sec- 
tor. 
1. In interpreting such results, however, three upward biases of these data must be 
noted. 
* Both prices and the total capital stock were increasing during the period. More 
specifically, the current dollar value of net private, non-residential, reproducible 
fixed private capital rose at an average annual rate of 5.1 percent over the 
period.6 
* The ratio of the value of the merger deal to the actual value of the capital 
buildings and equipment involved also rose, given the billion dollar sales of 
dot.com shops with few tangible assets (and no profits) to established 
companies wishing to enter the Internet market. For instance, in the early 
months of 2000 Amazon.com, which had accumulated losses of more than $1.2 
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Chart 1. Estimated Value of Business Mergers 
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billion and had never posted an annual profit, had a market value almost two and 
a half times larger than that of the highly profitable FedEx Corporation (FDX 
Corporation), even while its sales were less than one tenth of the latter (What's 
an Old-Line CEO to Do? 2000). In more general terms, in recent years Tobin's q 
ratio rose to historic heights up to the end of the twentieth century (Tobin and 
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Sommers 2000) before tumbling in 2000. This, in turn, suggests that the data on 
merger values through 1999 was upwardly biased in terms of the replacement 
value of the underlying assets. 
As noted above, as the company gathering these statistics gained experience, it 
missed fewer mergers, especially those occurring outside the United States, 
than during the 1980s. 
In 1999, total M&A activity involving US firms, either as a buyer or a seller, 
amounted to about $1.5 trillion. For comparison, the net stock of fixed reproducible 
non-residential tangible wealth of the private sector (excluding consumer durables) 
amounted to roughly $9.6 trillion in the same year.7 Thus, the relative magnitudes of 
M&A activities were large, even given the upward biases of the data on the total value 
of deals. At least for the purchase of US firms by non-US enterprises, the process was 
fueled by the US deficit in its balance of payments. 
The merger process has a peculiar inner momentum. For instance, the $76 billion 
merger of SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome to form the world's largest 
pharmaceutical company in January 2000 was driven in part by Warner-Lambert's 
announcement several days earlier that it was talking merger plans with Pfizer, which 
would have, in turn, created the world's largest drug company (Sorkin and Peterson 
2000). According to one stock analyst at that time, "In this era of merger mania, you 
don't want to be the last company without a partner." This suggests that the merger 
movement has had much of the inner dynamics of a middle-school dance. 
Size of Transaction 
For assessing the impact of mergers on industrial concentration, the size of the 
merger makes a considerable difference. If, for instance, small companies merge with 
each other, competition may be strengthened; if large companies merge with each 
other, the reverse may occur. The median and average sizes of the merger transactions 
provide an important clue about what is happening in this regard. 
Such data have some pitfalls that deserve mention. We would certainly expect 
that the average size of merger transactions would vary considerably from year to 
year, depending on whether mega-deals occur. For 2000, for instance, the five 
mega-deals mentioned in the introduction certainly considerably raised the average 
value of mergers. As noted above, the absolute magnitudes of the average total deals 
were sensitive to the assumption about the relative size of recorded and non-recorded 
deals, even though the trends in these magnitudes were not greatly affected. Finally, in 
1985, but not in later years, the merger data were truncated from below. 
Table 2 presents the relevant data on median and average size of both recorded 
and total merger deals. As expected, the estimates jumped around a good deal. The 
medians declined slightly between 1985 and 1999, while the average size of both 
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recorded and total deals increased. The widening gap between average and median 
size of the deals reflects an increasing importance of the mega-deals that combine sev- 
eral very large companies. 
Furthermore, the mergers in the individual one-digit industries increased even 
more than twice as fast in average size as the overall averages reported in table 2. For 
this estimate I weighted the average deal values in 1999 in one-digit industries by the 
number of merger deals in 1985 and, in another calculation, the average deal values in 
1985 in one-digit industries by the number of 1999 deals. The average size of recorded 
deals increased somewhat more than twice as much as that reported in table 2, and the 
average size of total deals, about 2.5 times as much. This means, of course, that the 
number of mergers increased more in those one-digit industries where the average size 
deals were smaller than overall average. 
Such results, combined with data presented below about the extent to which 
mergers have occurred in the same four-digit industries, reveal that in recent years 
merger activities have led to a considerable increase in industrial concentration. 
Sector of Transaction 
The results about average size of mergers when the relative number of deals is 
held constant mean that it is important to know in which sectors such a change in the 
Table 2. Average Size of Merger Transaction 
Buying companies: US US Non-US Non-US 
Target companies: US Non-US US Non-US Total 
Median size of recorded deals (million$) 
1985 36.0 30.5 36.4 24.0 34.8 
1992 8.7 14.0 8.4 9.7 9.4 
1999 25.0 30.0 27.4 11.5 18.2 
Average size of recorded deals (million$) 
1985 153.2 191.5 179.7 100.9 148.5 
1992 55.0 60.0 53.7 57.3 56.3 
1999 311.3 195.8 423.4 157.3 229.4 
Average size of estimated deals (million$) 
1985 89.6 51.9 105.0 65.7 86.2 
1992 31.1 29.1 34.6 26.8 28.7 
1999 161.5 94.6 259.1 80.4 117.7 
Note: For sources and methods, see footnote to table 1. 
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organization of industry is occurring. As shown in table 3, the sectoral distribution of 
mergers has considerably changed over time. For the merger targets, the share of pur- 
chases from the manufacturing and mining sectors has considerably decreased, while 
the purchases from the communications and the non-professional services sector have 
markedly increased. Of the buyers, the shares purchased by manufacturing and mining 
companies have considerably decreased, while the share of buyers from the communi- 
cations field has greatly increased. In all other sectors, the share of total targets and 
buyers has been relatively small. The same generalizations also hold when mergers 
are measured in terms of actual recorded values or number of mergers. Moreover, 
Table 3. Sector Composition of Total Estimated Value of Mergers 
Targets (%) Buyers (%) 
1985 1992 1999 1985 1992 1999 
Agric., forest., 
fishing 0-999 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 
Mining 1000-1499 11.3 4.7 6.6 13.8 3.6 6.3 
Contracting 1500-1999 0.3 1.2 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.4 
Manufacturing 2000-3999 49.5 40.5 28.6 50.6 39.5 32.6 
Transportation 4000-4799 4.2 2.2 1.5 3.0 2.8 1.3 
Communication 4800-4899 3.3 3.8 21.4 2.6 4.4 19.0 
Public utilities 4900-4999 4.1 3.5 5.3 3.9 3.3 6.3 
Wholesale trade 5000-5199 2.1 3.6 1.3 1.2 2.6 2.7 
Retail trade 5200-5999 4.7 3.3 3.3 3.7 2.8 3.1 
Financial 6000-6299 11.1 18.9 10.2 10.3 21.3 12.2 
Insurance 6300-6499 2.1 5.8 4.7 3.9 5.9 4.8 
Real estate 6500-6798 2.7 3.8 3.3 1.6 3.3 2.7 
Services, 
non-profes. 7000-7999 2.9 5.7 10.4 2.3 5.7 7.2 
Professional 
services 8000-8999 1.3 2.3 2.6 1.5 2.2 1.0 
Government 9000-9999 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.1 
Unknown 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: For sources and methods, see footnote to table 1. 
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these generalizations also hold by and large for both the US-US and the 
non-US-non-US deals. 
The sectoral distributions of US purchase of non-US firms was different from the 
general pattern because the deals were dominated by some large purchases in the min- 
ing and financial sectors in the mid 1 980s. Purchases from the mining industry (which 
includes the petroleum industry) also played a large role in the purchase of US firms 
by non-US companies in the same period. This international consolidation of the min- 
ing sector, however, was played out by the late 1 990s, when mining deals accounted 
for only a small percentage of total mergers. By way of contrast, in the late 1 990s, con- 
solidation in the banking sector had stepped up in the late 1990s and, for transborder 
mergers, the share of US purchases of non-US communication, utility, financial, and 
service enterprises increased dramatically. 
Geographical Distribution of Buyers and Targets 
Although table 1 shows a relative shift in the geographical distribution of merger 
activity from the US to foreign nations, it is useful to know whether such industrial 
concentration is occurring among industrial or developing nations. Table 4 presents 
more detailed data on the changing geographical distribution of targets and buyers. 
Most noticeably, the shares of both buyers or sellers accounted for by the United 
States and Canada have noticeably decreased, while the share of mergers accounted 
for by other industrial nations in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) rose considerably. This means that the worldwide merger tsu- 
nami has become increasingly important among industrial competitors of the United 
States from other economically developed nations. Outside the OECD nations, merger 
activity appeared relatively unimportant. For instance, in 1999 when looking at either 
buyers or targets, the share of merger deals outside of the OECD accounted for less 
than 7 percent of the total. Although this share of non-OECD merger deals rose 
between 1985 and 1992, it fell back in 1999. Nevertheless, in absolute terms the merg- 
ers involving nations outside the OECD greatly increased both in terms of volume and 
number. 
A Brief Summary 
The data presented above provide quantitative evidence for the qualitative 
impressions gained from reading the financial press: No matter whether measured in 
terms of number or value, M&A activity has increased dramatically in the last fifteen 
years of the twentieth century, not just in the United States but in the rest of the world 
as well, especially in other OECD nations. The average size of mergers also increased 
dramatically, both in individual industries and for industry as a whole. The focus of 
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Table 4. The Geographical Distribution of the Recorded Value of Mergers 
Targets (%) Buyers (%) 
1985 1992 1999 1985 1992 1999 
USA 79.2 44.1 52.2 88.3 43.5 58.4 
UK 5.2 13.7 13.6 4.0 12.3 9.3 
Canada 4.6 2.2 1.6 5.0 2.4 2.1 
France 0.1 10.4 6.7 0.1 6.8 3.7 
Germany 0.6 3.4 5.8 0.5 4.2 3.5 
Italy 0.1 3.8 3.9 0.2 4.4 3.9 
Japan 0.3 1.8 1.0 0.0 0.7 1.2 
Other OECD 8.3 11.9 10.3 0.8 16.6 11.5 
Rest of Europe 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.6 
Middle East, Israel, 
Egypt 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 
Rest of Africa 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.4 
Rest Asia/Oceania 0.3 3.2 1.8 0.3 3.2 2.5 
Rest of Americas 0.6 3.1 1.8 0.8 4.2 2.4 
Other, unknown 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: For consistency over the time period, the East European nations in the OECD are included in 
"rest of Europe" and Mexico is included in "Rest of the Americas." For other notes and sources see 
footnote to table 1. 
mergers has shifted from a predominance in manufacturing and mining to other sec- 
tors, particularly communications, financial, and services. In brief, the last decade and 
a half of the twentieth century has witnessed an important consolidation of the world 
capitalist system. 
Some Important Economic Implications of the Worldwide Explosion of Mergers 
Short-Run Impact on the Size of Firms 
A change in the size of the firm has some important effects. Various studies have 
linked enterprise size to degree of innovative activity, technological change, work sat- 
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isfaction, absenteeism, wage inequalities (greater within large firms), and the receipt 
of government subsidies (because some firms are too large to be allowed to fail). 
Nevertheless, increased merger activity does not necessarily mean that average 
firm size has increased. For instance, Lawrence J. White (1980) showed that between 
the 1950s and 1977, aggregate concentration in various industries reached a peak in 
the mid and late 1960s and then either tapered off (manufacturing, banking, or all 
non-financial corporations) or remained relatively constant. My own estimates for 
1958 through 1992 (2001b) provided additional evidence on this point for all 
non-agricultural enterprises.8 Obviously the relationships between M&A activity and 
various measures of aggregate concentration are not tight, because such activity can 
consist of firms buying other firms, while selling parts of their own firms at the same 
time. 
Previous merger booms in the United States reveal cycles of roughly equal mag- 
nitude (measured in terms of number), with peaks around 1900, 1929, 1963, and the 
early 1980s (Golbe and White 1993). The US merger boom from 1985 to 2000 was, 
however, somewhat different: It followed very closely the boom in the early 1980s, its 
magnitude was much greater than previous booms in the past, and the simultaneous 
buying and selling of parts of firms did not appear so important. 
As a result, enterprise size measured both in absolute and relative terms increased 
between 1992 and 1997. More specifically, a special tabulation of employment size of 
enterprises from the 1997 Census of Enterprise shows definite increases between 
1992 and 1997 in average domestic employment of enterprises over nineteen workers, 
a Florence median, and the average number of employees in the largest 100 or 1,000 
enterprises, as well as in terms of the percentage of employees in firms over of 100 or 
1,000. Such results appear to reflect the impact of the merger boom of the 1990s 
(Pryor 200 lb). If the foreign labor forces of US firms are included in the calculations, 
this conclusion of increasing enterprise size is reinforced. This result reflects, of 
course, the well-known tendency of large US firms to grow faster abroad than at home 
(Leonard 1976). In Europe, the situation was even more striking: since the early 1960s 
the employment size of large industrial firms has been steadily increasing up to the 
end of the twentieth century. 
Short-Run Impact on Market Concentration 
The extent to which firms are merging with other enterprises in the same or differ- 
ent industries can be readily determined by comparing the four-digit SIC codes of the 
buying and target firms. For such an exercise it is useful to distinguish the primary and 
the various secondary SIC codes, even though in many cases the determination of the 
primary SIC code raises some difficulties. The relevant data for such an analysis are 
contained in table 5. 
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Table 5. Share of Mergers within the Same Four-Digit SIC Industries 
Ranking of SIC codes 
Primary- Primary- Secondary- 
Buyer-target primary secondary secondary Total 
kveasured in terns of recorded value (%) 
US-US 1985 24.4 32.8 12.6 69.8 
1992 43.9 25.1 3.3 72.3 
1999 47.8 23.2 6.0 77.0 
US-non-US 1985 84.3 3.5 0.0 87.7 
1992 23.0 33.7 20.4 77.1 
1999 43.3 29.5 2.5 75.3 
Non-US-US 1985 42.9 32.5 2.0 77.4 
1992 19.6 16.8 3.7 40.2 
1999 57.3 15.0 4.6 76.9 
Non-US-non-US 1985 37.7 12.7 4.8 55.2 
1992 40.5 14.6 5.1 60.2 
1999 34.0 33.3 4.7 72.0 
Total 1985 29.6 29.9 10.1 69.7 
1992 39.9 19.8 5.1 64.9 
1999 43.7 26.2 5.2 75.1 
Measured in terms of number of mergers with a recorded value (%) 
Total 1985 28.9 20.3 6.5 55.7 
1992 34.9 13.6 3.4 51.9 
1999 32.4 14.6 2.7 49.8 
Measured in terms of total number of mergers (%) 
Total 1985 28.7 19.0 4.3 52.0 
1992 38.0 12.6 2.3 52.9 
1999 34.8 13.6 2.2 50.6 
Note: For sources and methods, see footnote to Table 1. 
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The major conclusion can be concisely stated: In value terms, roughly two-thirds 
to three-fourths of all mergers with recorded deal values in the three benchmark years 
were within the same SIC industry. In 1999, 43.7 percent of mergers were between 
firms with the same primary SIC codes. Measured in terms of number, the share of 
mergers between firms with the same SIC codes was about half, which provides more 
evidence that the mergers involved large companies. In brief, horizontal mergers 
seemed to dominate M&A activity in the last fifteen years of the twentieth century. 
This is yet another way that the merger boom after 1985 was unique since in previous 
years; conglomerate or vertical mergers seemed to dominate. For instance, William N. 
Leonard (1976) showed that between 1960 and 1973, merger activity had no signifi- 
cant impact on market concentration. 
The data in table 5 also provide several surprises. Contrary to expectations, hori- 
zontal mergers comprised a somewhat higher share of total mergers in the United 
States than abroad (the US-US mergers). I expected that because antitrust enforce- 
ment has been tougher in the United States than in most other countries, US companies 
would be more wary of such mergers. Moreover, firms in many non-US countries face 
a more regulated business environment, so that more specialized expertise in this 
regard is required of business managers. Thus, it might seem as though such 
cross-industrial mergers would be more risky outside the United States. 
Several answers to this puzzle are possible. First, many of the horizontal mergers 
occurring in the United States are between firms in the same industry but in different 
markets, for instance, between banks dealing with geographically distinct markets, 
and such mergers are generally not subject to antitrust action. Second, because anti- 
trust authorities have turned away from simple per se rules about ostensible market 
shares and are employing more sophisticated criteria-including international com- 
petitiveness-constraints on mergers arising from the possibility of antitrust action 
have been loosened. Third, US antitrust authorities have become more lax in their 
enforcement of current laws, in part because of budgetary constraints, in part because 
cross-border mergers are not considered worrisome. Finally, considerable deregula- 
tion has occurred abroad, especially among many OECD nations, so that the regula- 
tory difficulties in cross-industry are much less severe than formerly. 
Another surprise occurs because it would seem likely that horizontal mergers 
occurring across national lines would be in the same industry, reducing the risk of 
entering a new industry in a different nation. For non-US companies buying US firms, 
such an expectation is certainly met. Nevertheless, for US companies buying compa- 
nies abroad, the share of such horizontal mergers is slightly below those of US firms 
buying other US firms. This puzzle is difficult to explain. 
The increased industrial concentration that seems to be occurring as a result of 
these mergers is disturbing, because it suggests that market competition may decrease 
as well. Further, imports may serve as less of a competitive force in the US economy, 
either because the "foreign" enterprises exporting to the United States are owned by 
US firms or because industrial concentration among these non-US exporters is 
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greater. Further exploration of this issue would, unfortunately, take us too far afield 
from the focus of this brief essay. 
Long-Run Impacts 
An important aftermath of the conglomerate merger boom in the 1960s and 1970s 
in the United States was a divestment of many of these purchases as enterprises turned 
back to their core businesses ("back to basics"). Given that a large share of the M&As 
in the current merger boom are horizontal, the probability of future divestment seems 
less. 
In many cases where the two merged firms are producing the same product, there 
may be no obvious way of splitting the firm, especially if the two parts were closely 
integrated. Indeed, in many cases the major purpose of the merger was to gain market 
share so that the managers would not want to divest part of the firm, holding the 
long-run hope that eventually the firm would be highly profitable. When divestment 
occurs in troubled horizontal mergers, the unrelated parts of the firm are often the first 
to be divested, not the core business. For instance, in the latter part of the 1990s Aetna 
Insurance bought a number of other insurance firms including U.S. Healthcare ($8.9 
billion), New York Life, NYL-Care ($ 1.1 billion), and Prudential HealthCare ($1 bil- 
lion). These mergers did not prove successful and, after turning down several offers of 
purchase, the company began in early 2000 to split the firm into two separate compa- 
nies, one focusing on health care and the other on financial services.9 In such a divest- 
ment, the increased market share of the mergers would be maintained. 
Several long-term factors, however, seem likely to nullify some of the short-term 
anti-competitive aspects of the current merger boom: 
* Many of the mergers were carried out quickly and for allegedly defensive 
purposes. As a result, a considerable number of these mergers may founder in 
the future. Indeed, some of these mergers were between enterprises with weak 
market positions because of the lack of new products, either at the time of the 
merger or in the pipeline. In such cases, it is doubtful whether increased size will 
solve these problems. For instance, among the world's eighteen largest 
pharmaceutical companies, eleven of the twelve companies which experienced 
mergers lost (combined) market share between 1990 and 1998, while all six of 
the companies which had not merged gained market share (New Alchemy 
2000). Similar difficulties have appeared in other mergers.10 
* To the extent that smaller firms are more innovative, the long-run market share 
of these giant firms may erode. 
As I have shown elsewhere (2001a; 2002), concentration ratios in the United 
States fell from the early 1960s up to the early 1980s and then began to increase. In the 
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coming decade they seem likely to continue to increase further. Furthermore, even 
when concentration ratios are recalculated to add imports to total shipments in order to 
take crudely into account the impact of foreign competition, these trade-adjusted con- 
centration ratios increased after the early 1980s. The merger boom seems to be the 
underlying cause. 
The data provided above on the high degree of horizontal transatlantic mergers, 
not to mention horizontal mergers occurring where both enterprises are located 
abroad, provides support for the possibility that increased foreign trade may not pro- 
vide the same competitive impulse that it provided in the past. For instance, it is not 
correct to argue that competition in the auto industry has increased because the import 
share is now larger than in the past, because the imports of Mercedes, Volvo, and Saab 
automobiles are now part of the product lines respectively of Chrysler, Ford, and GM. 
Recent purchases by US auto companies of large shares of Japanese auto makers (for 
instance, DaimlerChrysler's purchase of a controlling interest of Mitsubishi Motor 
Corporation) make this situation even worse. 
In brief, if the world merger boom of the 1 990s continues into the new millennium 
and if horizontal divestments do not increase in a spectacular manner, industrial con- 
centration will increase in the United States, in other OECD nations, and in the world 
as a whole. 
Notes 
1. The other three mergers were SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome ($76 billion), 
Pfizer and Warner-Lambert ($92 billion), and WarnerRecords (part of AOL-Time-Warner) 
with the music division of EMI ($20 billion). 
2. These issues are explored in detail in Pryor 2001a. 
3. More information about the company, the data, and how the data can be obtained are pre- 
sented on the TFSD webpages: http://www.investext.com or, more generally, http:// 
www.tfsd.com. 
4. These aggregate series are roughly similar to the data from the company that are published 
in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999, table 891. 
5. This series used for interpolation, provided by the TFSD, is roughly similar to that pre- 
sented in Statistical Abstract 1999, table 891. 
6. This is calculated from data drawn from tangible wealth estimates of the US Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2.htm). 
7. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999, table 774. The datum in the text represents an 
extrapolation from data from 1996 and 1997. 
8. Leonard (1976) showed an increase in size from 1955 through 1974, but his data included 
foreign as well as domestic employment of large firms. Aspects of this issue receive atten- 
tion below. 
9. It is noteworthy that in 2000, Aetna-U.S. Healthcare was a target of takeovers by other 
insurance companies, who were offering a price for the entire company that was less than 
what Aetna paid for its acquired parts a few years before. 
10. For instance, rail mergers have proven difficult and have resulted in freight delays and dete- 
rioration in other services. As a result of these problems, two years after their 1998 shared 
purchase of most of Conrail, the combined market valuation of CSX and Norfolk Southern 
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fell below the price that they had paid for Conrail. Despite such problems, in late 1999 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway announced merger talks with the Canadian 
National Railway (which had been denationalized less than a decade before). Such actions 
led the CEO of the remaining large railroad in the United States, the Union Pacific, to 
declare: "Our customers think we're nuts to start a new round of mergers today" (DePalma 
2000). The Surface Transportation Board evidently agreed and in March 2000 declared a 
fifteen-month moratorium on all railroad mergers. 
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